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Impulsive choice—the preference for small immediate rewards over larger delayed
rewards—has been linked to various psychological conditions ranging from behavioral
disorders to addiction. These links highlight the critical need to dissect the various
components of this multifaceted behavioral trait. Delay discounting tasks allow
researchers to study an important factor of this behavior: how the subjective value of a
rewards changes over a delay period. However, existing methods of delay discounting
include a confound of different reward sizes within the procedure. Here we present a
new approach of using a single constant reward size to assess delay discounting. A
complementary approach could hold delay constant and assess the utility of changing
quantities of a reward. Isolating these behavioral components can advance our ability to
explore the behavioral complexity of impulsive choice. We present in detail the methods
for isolating delay, and further capitalize on this method by pairing it with a standard peak
interval task to test whether individual variation in delay discounting can be explained by
differences in perception of time in male and female adolescent rats. We find that rats that
were more precise in discriminating time intervals were also less impulsive in their choice.
Our data suggest that differences in timing and delay discounting are not causally related,
but instead are more likely influenced by a common factor. Further, the mean-level change
in our measure between post-natal day 28 and 42 suggests this test may be capturing a
developmental change in this factor. In summary, this new method of isolating individual
components of impulsive choice (delay or quantity) can be efficiently applied in either
adolescent or adult animal models and may help elucidate the mechanisms underlying
impulsivity and its links to psychological disorders.
Keywords: impulsive choice, delay discounting, peak interval, adolescence, sex differences
INTRODUCTION
Impulsive choice—the preference for small immediate rewards
over larger delayed rewards—has been linked to substance abuse
and addiction (Madden et al., 1997; Poulos et al., 1998; Mitchell,
1999; Mitchell et al., 2005; Field et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2008;
Diergaarde et al., 2008; Oberlin and Grahame, 2009; Broos et al.,
2012; Smith and Boettiger, 2012; Pattij and De Vries, 2013) and
other psychological disorders such as attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder (Winstanley et al., 2006) and schizophrenia (Heerey
et al., 2007). These connections highlight the importance of
exploring the mechanisms that govern impulsive choice, espe-
cially for adolescent populations (Whelan et al., 2012). However,
measuring impulsive choice in adolescent animals can be chal-
lenging due to the brief duration within which animals can be
pre-trained and tested for measures of impulsive choice. Another
more general challenge is in interpretation of results from exist-
ing tests as there are two distinct causes of a preference for a
small immediate reward over a larger delayed reward: either an
increased aversion to delay, or a decreased sensitivity to reward
size. These two potential drivers of impulsive choice are con-
founded in common behavioral tasks. We therefore present an
approach that allows for the isolation and separate quantification
of each component. The method for isolating delay is elaborated
upon and applied below.
Organisms generally prefer shorter delays and larger reward
quantities, but the relationship between the perceived value of a
reward and either of these parameters is not linear (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Bateson, 2002). More specifically, while the
value of a reward continues to decrease as the delay increases, the
greatest decrease in value is during the initial delay. This delay dis-
counting relationship can be seen in Figure 1 where the greatest
decrease in reward value occurs on the left side of the plot. For any
non-linear function such as this, the average result of the func-
tion applied to two delay values differs from the result of the same
function applied to the average of the two delays. To illustrate,
the average discounted value of a delay alternating between 2 and
18 s (dotted lines in Figure 1) is greater than the discounted value
of the same reward delayed 10 s (solid line). This mathematical
property, known as Jensen’s inequality (Jensen, 1906), is relevant
to any study of variable properties and has been finding increas-
ingly broad applicability within biology (Smallwood, 1996; Ruel
and Ayres, 1999). Following the predictions of Jensen’s inequality,
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FIGURE 1 | The subjective value of a delayed reward. The discounted
value of a delayed reinforcer is modeled by a hyperbolic function. Here
f (delay) = (1+ K × delay)−1 where “K” defines the shape of the
discounting curve (green: K = 0.25, black: K = 0.5, red: K = 2.0). Higher
K -values (red) are characteristic of greater impulsive choice. In each case,
the average of the values of the variable options—shown, for the black
function, in dotted lines—is greater than the value of their average which is
shown as a solid line. This difference (Jensen’s inequality) holds for any
concave up function, but the difference is greater for functions with higher
K -values. In other words, the difference between the variable and fixed
delay options is greatest for the red line, moderate for the black line, and
least for the green line.
organisms are often seen to prefer variable delays over fixed delays
with the same average duration.
Although there is a general trend to prefer variable delays, the
strength of this preference can differ greatly between individu-
als. Differences in the sharpness of the delay discounting curve
(Figure 1) can be used to describe these individual differences.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 shows the delay functions of
three hypothetical subjects: red, black, and green. All three sub-
jects would value a variable delay over the fixed delay, but the red
subject presents a strong preference for the variable option (more
impulsive), while the green subject presents a weaker preference
for variability (less impulsive). As such, for each curve, a fixed
delay less than 10 s would have the same discounted value as the
average of the discounted values of 2 and 18 s, and this fixed delay
would be lowest for the red curve, moderate for the black, and
highest for the green curve.
This timing information, along with reward size, contributes
to behavior in typical delay discounting tasks. Common behav-
ioral assays of delay discounting provide variable and fixed delay
options with different reward sizes for each (Ainslie, 1975; Dalley
et al., 2011). As neither variable of delay or quantity is held con-
stant, however, it cannot be known which is driving the resulting
preference. While the mean adjusting delay task (Mazur, 1988)
does hold the quantity constant across trials, it offers a choice
between two options of differing reward quantity. Indeed, a recent
study (Madden et al., 2011) questions whether preferences for
variable delays correlate with impulsive choice. The failure to find
such a correlation may be—as noted by the authors—due to pref-
erences being influenced not only by delay, but also by reward size
in the compound impulsive-choice task. These data further high-
light the need to disentangle the delay and quantity parameters
to further our understanding of impulsive choice, particularly in
adolescent populations that show greater sensitivity to reward size
(Laviola et al., 2003; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).
We therefore take an alternative approach inspired by paral-
lel work in behavioral ecology (Caraco et al., 1980; Caraco, 1981;
Real et al., 1982; Real and Caraco, 1986) that maintains a constant
reward size—and uses the same reward for each choice option—
and systematically reduces the delay on the fixed lever (now an
adjusting “stable” lever) to the point at which it has the same sub-
jective value as the variable option. This point of equal preference,
or equivalence point (Mazur, 1984), allows precise determination
of the shape of each subject’s delay discounting curve while using
the same reward quantity for all options. We also optimized pre-
training procedures to allow the method to be practical for use
with early adolescent rodent models.
We apply this method to test two hypotheses on the source of
individual variation in delay discounting. First, delay discounting
scores may be driven by differences in time perception. If so, a
decreased ability to precisely discriminate time intervals should
lead to lower delay discounting scores in our task. If an animal
were unable to discriminate between any time intervals it would
not detect a difference between the variable and fixed option and
its choice would be random. Similarly, any imprecision in time
perception can be expected to partially mask the expression of a
preference for variable delays; animals that are less precise may
thus show lesser delay discounting. Alternatively, greater timing
ability and less extreme delay discounting could each be consid-
ered products of a healthy or well-developed nervous system and
if found togethermight indicate a shared neurological mechanism
for the two processes. Our findings suggest that differences in time
perception do not drive differences in delay discounting. Instead,
there is likely a common biological mechanism that enhances
time perception and also increases the ability to wait longer for
a reward in adolescent animals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ANIMALS
Wistar rats (21 males, 19 females) were shipped with mothers
from Charles River (Wilmington, MA) and arrived on post-natal
day (PD) 18. Rats were kept on a 12–12 h light dark cycle (lights
on from 8 am–8 pm). On PD 21 they were weaned and separated
into same-sex cages of 3 juveniles per cage. Animals were fed ad
libitum rat chow and had free access to food and water throughout
all stages of training and testing. Animals acclimated to human
contact by a minimum of 5min of handling per day. All ani-
mal procedures were approved by the University of Massachusetts
Amherst Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.
OPERANT PRE-TRAINING
Prior to the onset of adolescence (PD23–PD27), rats were pre-
trained to lever press in operant boxes in overnight sessions using
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a fixed ratio 1 (FR1) reinforcement schedule for 0.1ml sweetened
water (3% glucose/0.125% saccharin/tap water) as previously
described (Gilpin et al., 2012). The same sweetened water reward
was used for all following procedures. In the present study, pre-
training sessions were conducted for 8 h overnight during the rats’
dark/active period. A session was divided into 5-min bouts sepa-
rated by a 1-min pauses in which the levers were retracted. Each
bout was randomly assigned by the operant software to present
the left lever, right lever, or both levers simultaneously. The sin-
gle lever bouts ensured that rats sampled both levers. The session
terminated when either 8 h had passed or the rat had received 300
rewards, whichever came first.
Our laboratory has found that allowing multiple rats to run
together in a single box for their first training sessions leads to
improved performance in operant tasks. On PD 23 rats ran 3-
per-box on the FR1 pre-training task. On PD 24–26 they were
run 2-per-box switching partners each night. On PD 27 they ran
singly which allowed assessment of their baseline lever pressing.
By PD 27 all rats were actively pressing levers for the sweetened
water reward. Impulsive choice (Experiments 1 and 2) or peak
interval tasks (Experiment 2) began on PD 28. An overview of the
design of both experiments is presented in Figure 2.
EXPERIMENT 1—TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY
Experiment 1 evaluated the test-retest validity of our impulsive
choice measure. High reliability should indicate the measure is
assessing a trait or characteristic of the individual as opposed
to being driven by their current state. Twenty-nine adolescent
rats (14 males, 15 females) were tested for delay discounting as
described below during early adolescence (PD 28–42) and again
in early adulthood (PD 58–64).
Delay discounting testing
To quantify delay discounting (a component of impulsive choice),
we developed an operant methodmodeled after variance sensitive
FIGURE 2 | Timeline and experimental design. All measures were taken
during adolescence or early adulthood. The test-retest consistency of the
impulsive choice scores was assessed in Experiment 1: rats were tested
from post-natal day (PD) 28–42 and retested from PD 58 to 64. The
correlation between impulsive choice and peak interval performance was
measured in a counterbalanced design: one cohort of the rats was tested
for impulsive choice from PD 28 to 42 and peak interval performance from
PD 44 to 56, the other cohort was the reverse.
foraging (Stephens et al., 2007) and operant equivalence point
tasks (Mazur, 1984, 1986; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996, 1997). We
designed our method for maximum efficiency so that animals
could be studied during the brief window of adolescence, though
the same procedures have also been used with naive adult ani-
mals. This important developmental period lasts approximately
4 weeks in rats and mice, with pubertal maturation occurring in
the first half and brain development continuing on through the
second half (Spear, 2000; Smith, 2003; Sisk and Zehr, 2005). We
therefore ran this operant test for 8 h during rats’ dark (active)
period every night for 2 weeks. At the start of the first session the
stable lever (left lever for half of the rats, right for the other half)
was set to a 10-s delay. The session began with 9 forced trials in
which only one lever (randomly selected per trial) was available
to ensure the rats were sampling both levers. After having sam-
pled both contingencies, rats were allowed 21 free trials in which
their preferences could be expressed as elaborated below. Under
these test conditions our animals quickly showed preferences for
the variable lever, consistent with previous findings (Bateson and
Kacelnik, 1995, 1998). Once this preference for the variable lever
was expressed, the delay on the fixed (now “stable”) lever was
gradually reduced over subsequent trials (Figure 3). This is in
contrast to othermethods that increase the quantity or concentra-
tion of the reward on the fixed lever. By decreasing the delay, the
quality and quantity of all rewards remained constant throughout
training and testing, and only delay was manipulated.
Training continued in repeating cycles of 9 forced trials and
21 free trials. The delay on the stable lever, set by the customized
operant software, was reduced (−1 s) if the animal showed a pref-
erence for the variable lever (12 or more of the 21 presses on
the variable lever) and increased (+1 s) if they showed a prefer-
ence for the stable lever (9 or fewer presses on the variable lever).
After each adjustment the subject was given another 9 forced
trials so they could sample the new delay contingencies before
another round of free trials. Training continued in 9+ 21 trial
cycles throughout the night until either 8 h had passed or the rat
received 300 rewards.
Every trial—forced sampling and choice trials—was initiated
by the presentation of the lever and terminated when the rat
pressed either lever. Upon a lever press, both levers were retracted
and a stimulus light above the selected lever was illuminated
throughout the pre-reward delay period. After the presentation
of the reward, there was a 5 s intertrial interval. No post-reward
delay, other than the fixed intertrial interval, was used.
On each subsequent night (8 pm) the delay on the stable lever
was set to start where it ended the previous night.When a rat’s sta-
ble delay lever remained constant due to the rat choosing either
option equally often (or if it oscillated between two adjacent
values), the adjustment step-size was reduced. At this point the
operant software increased or decreased the stable lever by 0.5 s
instead of 1 s in response to the rat’s preference. Over subsequent
nights this step-size was further reduced to increase the precision
on the stable lever at which the rat had an equivalent preference
for the variable and stable levers. The final delay on the stable lever
was the rat’s equivalence point (Mazur, 1986).
The degree to which the stable lever needed to be decreased
(10 s minus the equivalence point) was used as our delay dis-
counting score. This is effectively the same as the equivalence
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FIGURE 3 | Overview of a single impulsive choice trial. Each free choice
trial in the operant test presents the subject with a choice for a
stable/adjusting delay reward (R) and a variable delay reward. The variable
delay is set randomly per trial to 2 or 18 s. The adjusting delay (X) is
adjusted after 21 free trials based on a subject’s preference: 12 or more
choices of the variable option result in a decrease in the stable delay; 9 or
fewer choices of the variable option result in an increase in the stable delay.
The amount the adjusting delay is reduced from the initial value of 10 s is
used as an animal’s delay discounting score.
point, but has an advantage for interpretation given that a higher
value indicates greater delay discounting (the more “impulsive”
choice). This offset (“x” in Equations 1 and 2) score can be used to
calculate an individual’s rate-constant (K) for delay discounting.
As described earlier, delay discounting follows a hyperbolic
decay (Figure 1) modeled by Equation 1 (Bateson and Kacelnik,
1998). The above method of testing impulsive choice is modeled
by Equation 2: the delay on the stable lever is reduced by an off-
set (x) such that the animal assigns an equal value to this stable
delay as to the average of the variable delay options. In the above
described method the delay (d) is 10 s, and the variability () is
8 s. K is each individual’s discounting rate constant; higher K-
values represent more rapid delay discounting. An individual’s
K-value can be calculated from their offset (impulsive choice)
score by Equation 3. The α parameter is a small constant, often
set to 1 in many studies.
Value = 1
α+ K × d (1)
2
α+ K(d− x) =
1
α+ K(d−) +
1
α+ K(d+) (2)
K = a× x
2 − d× x (3)
Data analysis
Individual consistency, or test-retest validity, was assessed by
regressing post-test scores of delay discounting (10minus the
equivalence point) on pre-test scores. The sex of the animal
was included to assess for sex-specific differences or interaction
effects. All analyses were conducted in the R statistical software
package (R Core Team, 2012).
EXPERIMENT 2—TIMING AND DELAY DISCOUNTING
Experiment 2 tested the prediction that lesser precision in timing
would correlate with lower levels of delay discounting. Twenty-
two rats (10 males, 12 females) were tested on delay discounting
(following the same methods as Experiment 1) and peak interval
performance (described below) during early (PD 28–42) and late
(PD 42–56) adolescence (Spear, 2000; Smith, 2003; Sisk and Zehr,
2005). This experiment was counterbalanced by testing half of
the rats on delay discounting first followed by peak interval, and
the other half receiving the peak interval followed by our delay
discounting task.
Peak interval testing
A peak interval task was used to assess accuracy and precision in
discriminating time intervals. This task used a fixed interval (FI)
11 s reinforcement schedule in which the first response after 11 s
is rewarded with the same sweetened water reward used in other
procedures. There was no punishment nor response cost for early
responses, and the response lever remained available throughout
a trial. Under fixed interval schedules, organisms tend to begin
responding at a low rate and increase response frequency as the
criterion (11 s) approaches.
Peak interval was conducted in three stages each night in the
same operant boxes used in other procedures but using only the
right lever for all animals. In the first stage, a trial was initiated
by the presentation of a single lever. After the criteria time (11 s)
had elapsed, the stimulus light above the lever was illuminated
indicating the availability of the reward. The second stage changed
only in the absence of the stimulus light but maintained the same
FI-11 criterion. The third stage was identical to the second, but
included probe trials.
Probe trials were interspersed randomly with fixed interval
trials. Probe trials were identical to fixed interval trials except
that the reward mechanism was disabled. Response frequencies in
probe trials tend to increase as the criterion time approaches, then
taper off when no reward is delivered. Pooled across probe trials,
response frequency distributions resemble a normal distribution.
For a given subject, the average of this distribution indicates the
accuracy with which they can discriminate the criterion interval,
with the variance indicative of their precision.
Rats began peak interval testing on either PD 28 or PD 44,
depending on whether they were tested before or after impulsive
choice, respectively (Figure 3). Testing was conducted during the
rats’ active period (dark phase) every night for 7 days. Probe trials
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were interspersed with fixed interval trials by random selection
(without replacement) for 1 out of 8 trials to be a probe trial.
As the rats needed time to learn the task, data from the first two
nights were not included in the analysis. Data on the time of each
response—measured from the start of the trial—from the last five
nights was pooled from all probe trials for each rat. The mean
and standard deviation of all responses were used as measures of
an animal’s accuracy and precision in timing respectively.
Data analysis
Delay discounting scores (10minus the equivalence point) were
regressed on interval standard deviation (precision) scores from
the peak interval task, to estimate the proportion of variance in
delay discounting accounted for by differences in perceptual dis-
crimination and test the prediction of lesser precision correlating
with lower delay discounting. Sex was included as a control vari-
able in all analyses to allow for the detection of sex-specific effects
or interactions. All analyses were conducted in the R statistical
software package (R Core Team, 2012).
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1—TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY
Individual equivalence point scores in Experiment 1 were highly
consistent over time as seen in Figure 4 (R2 = 0.758; p < 0.0001).
This suggests that our method is detecting a repeatable trait of the
individual. As this trait is the degree to which the value of a rein-
forcer declines with delay (delay discounting) it can be regarded
as an index of impulsive choice.While this rank-order consistency
was high, we also detected a mean-level increase in delay dis-
counting scores between the pre- and post-tests [t(28) = 3.29; p =
0.0027] suggesting a developmental or potentially experience-
dependent increase in discounting rates. This change from pre-
to post-test was similar for males and females [mean increase
for males: 0.49± 0.18 and females: 0.57± 0.27; t(27) = 0.25; p =
0.80].
EXPERIMENT 2—TIMING AND IMPULSIVE CHOICE
The variance of responses (standard deviation) correlated posi-
tively with delay discounting scores, as seen in Figure 5 (R2 =
0.40; p = 0.02). Animals that scored as less precise (more vari-
ance) in their temporal discrimination abilities also showed
greater discounting (b = 1.40; p = 0.015). This effect was
stronger in males and the significance of the overall effect
was driven by males (males b = 3.88; p = 0.007) while females
trended in the same direction (females b = 0.93; p = 0.15). Thus,
greater precision in interval timing correlated with lower delay
discounting.
No relationship was found between mean response times on
probe trials and delay discounting scores (R2 = 0.03; p = 0.73).
Thus, in our sample, we found no relationship between delay
discounting and the accuracy of timing. Neither did the total
number of responses on probe trials significantly correlate with
delay discounting (R2 = 0.21; p = 0.22).
Following Bateson and Kacelnik (1995) we also analyzed the
relationship between the final equivalence point and the latency
to respond for each option. As our task is defined as terminat-
ing when an equal preference is displayed, we sampled latencies
FIGURE 4 | Delay discounting scores in the pre- and post-tests (PD
28–42 and PD 58–64) are strongly correlated (R2 = 0.758; p < 0.0001).
The inset graph shows representative delay discounting curves from two
males and two females. Delay discounting scores are the degree to which
the stable lever had to be reduced: higher scores indicate more rapid delay
discounting which would be characteristic of a more impulsive choice.
FIGURE 5 | Imprecision in timing predicts delay discounting. Greater
variance in the estimation of the interval in the peak interval task was
positively correlated with greater discounting scores (R2 = 0.40; p = 0.02).
This effect was driven by the males (males b = 3.88; p = 0.007), while the
females showed a trend in the same direction (females b = 0.93; p = 0.15).
from early in training (days 2 and 3) when the animals should
have had sufficient experiences with the contingencies, but had
not yet approached an equivalence point, as well as late in
training (days 13 and 14) when their preferences were stabi-
lizing. Median response latencies to individual levers did not
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correlate with final equivalence points, nor did differential laten-
cies between the levers (all p > 0.5). However, overall median
latency to respond correlated positively with equivalence points
(R2 = 0.25; p = 0.048).
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to present a method that iso-
lates the delay component of impulsive choice, and to apply this
method to explore a behavioral mechanism that may underlie
delay discounting. Results from Experiment 1 suggest that the
measure of delay discounting we introduce here provides a robust
and state-independent index of an individual trait. Additionally,
as shown in Experiment 2, 40% of the observed variability in
this trait can be accounted for by individual differences in time-
interval discrimination ability. This correlation, however, is in the
opposite direction from what would be predicted if differences in
delay discounting were driven by differences in timing. Instead,
delay discounting and timing are likely each influenced by a com-
mon mediating factor. By using the present approach we were
able to keep reward size constant, thus narrowing down the likely
mechanisms driving decision making in our animals.
While the current study assessed only the delay component of
impulsive choice, a similar logic could be applied to study the
effects of varying quantities or rewards while keeping delay con-
stant. Together these methods can disentangle the timing and
reward size components of this multifaceted behavior. By iso-
lating the delay component in the current study, we found that
rats that show greater delay discounting also show less preci-
sion in a peak interval timing task. This finding is in contrast to
what might be expected given that all subjects prefer the variable
delay option: any deficiency in timing would be expected to mask
this preference and lead to a less impulsive score. Poor perfor-
mance on the timing task and greater discounting in the same
subjects are thus indicative of a separate shared mediating factor.
While peak interval allowed a preliminary test of these alternative
hypotheses, the current finding may be best expanded by fur-
ther exploring the relationship using delay discrimination tasks
in place of peak interval. In either case, employing the above elab-
orated delay discounting task will allow for proper isolation of the
timing component of the choice task.
INDIVIDUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES
Although our tests were conducted during an active period
of neurological development in rats, the individual differences
detected were highly consistent from the pre- to the post-test
(rank-order consistency) in both males and females despite the
wide range of between-individual variability in this measure.
These levels of consistency are greater than those observed for
human personality traits (Roberts and DelVecchio, 2000). There
were, however, also small but significant mean-level changes in
the population between the two tests. Rats discounted delayed
rewards more steeply in the test in early adulthood (PD 58–64)
than they did in early adolescence (PD 28–42). While these data
seem to run counter to a general trend of decreasing delay dis-
counting through development (Green et al., 1994; Steinberg
et al., 2009), it may be that early adolescence is a time of greater
discounting after which further development would lead again
to lower discounting rates. We cannot yet, however, rule out
experience as a driver of greater discounting scores in this task.
Future studies could include additional testing periods in early,
mid, and late adulthood to help address this.
Various circuits that contribute to delay discounting are
actively developing over this period of adolescence. For example,
individual differences in delay discounting have been attributed
to variation in dopamine signaling (Forbes et al., 2007) using tra-
ditional methods of testing delay discounting. More specifically,
genotypic variation in the dopamine transporter (DAT) gene cor-
relates with individual differences in impulsive choice in human
studies (Paloyelis et al., 2010), while experimental increases of
DAT expression in animal studies drive greater impulsive choice
(Adriani et al., 2009).
Dopaminergic activity in the ventral tagmental area (VTA)
correlates with reward-size prediction error in fMRI BOLD sig-
nals in humans (D’Ardenne et al., 2008) and in neural record-
ings in animal models (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Tobler et al.,
2005). The VTA relays this signal to the nucleus accumbens
(NAcc) (Glimcher, 2011) where the higher levels of DAT activ-
ity are associated with greater delay discounting. This dopamine
reuptake has been suggested to underlie decaying reward value
curves—such as those in Figure 1—and thus individual differ-
ences in DAT in the NAcc could create differences in the resulting
delay discounting curves. Many components of the dopamine
system in addition to DAT correlate with impulsive choice in
adolescent populations, but DAT and the dopamine D4 recep-
tor show the most consistent associations (Nemoda et al., 2011).
This dopaminergic circuitry is known to be actively developing
through adolescence making this developmental stage a sensitive
period for addiction (Chambers et al., 2003; Kuhn et al., 2010;
Nemoda et al., 2011; Smith and Boettiger, 2012).
Several previous authors have proposed learning mechanisms
that pair such a decaying reward signal with a reverse replay of
recent events (Dragoi et al., 2003; Foster and Wilson, 2006; Kühn
and Stamatescu, 2007; Pennartz et al., 2009). For example, in vivo
hippocampal recordings in maze-running rats have shown a pat-
tern of rapid reward-induced reverse-order replays of place cells
(Foster and Wilson, 2006). These replays, or hippocampal rip-
ples, have been further characterized and found to be coincident
with similar ripple patterns in other brain regions including the
NAcc (Goto and O’Donnell, 2001; Malhotra et al., 2012). As the
hippocampal input to the NAcc can provide a temporal context
(O’Donnell, 1999) it has been further suggested that this input
can also provide more general contextual information (Goto and
O’Donnell, 2001).
The correlation between decreased precision in timing and
greater delay discounting that we observe suggests a correlated
regulation of the dopamine signaling and timing circuitry that
is commonly seen in schizophrenia (Heerey et al., 2007; Bonnot
et al., 2011). The proposed circuitries for delay discounting and
timing are also disrupted in animalmodels of schizophrenia (Kato
et al., 2011; Nason et al., 2011). Schizophrenia in turn, has been
proposed to be the result of abnormalities in the reorganization
of this circuitry during adolescence (Feinberg, 1983; Jaaro-Peled
et al., 2009). There may be variations in the development of this
same circuitry in healthy populations as well; these variations may
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contribute to the correlation of timing and delay discounting we
observe, and could also contribute to the mean-level change in
delay discounting between our two testing periods.
In addition to the potential developmental effects, perfor-
mance on the peak interval task is likely modulated by hormonal
effects. Ovarian hormones are known to affect interval timing
(Ross and Santi, 2000; Morofushi et al., 2001; Sandstrom, 2007;
Pleil et al., 2011; Williams, 2012) such that intact females at dif-
ferent stages of their cycle may perform notably differently. This
may account for the lack of a significant relationship between
peak interval timing and our delay discounting score in females—
as can be seen in Figure 5 where females show a wider range of
imprecision in timing than males. This can be contrasted to delay
discounting scores which have a comparable range in males and
females (present study; Cross et al., 2011). Thus, we suspect the
lack of a significant correlation in females is due to noise in the
peak interval data rather than the delay discounting data.
CHALLENGES IN INTERPRETING COMPOUND CHOICE TASKS
The primary motivation in presenting the current method is
to isolate the distinct components that contribute to impulsive
choice. Impulsive choice is defined as a preference for a small
immediate reward over a larger delayed reward; such a preference,
however, can be the result of an aversion to delay, or an insensitiv-
ity to differing reward sizes. By isolating each factor, we hope to
better characterize choice behavior in these tasks which may aid
in understanding some conflicting results in the literature.
When presented with repeated choices for a small immedi-
ate reward or a larger delayed reward animals’ responses may
be influenced both by the delay discounting and quantity valu-
ing utility curves. These choices, however, may also be affected
by a number of other factors. Animals may assess the long-term
rate of intake for each option which may bias them toward the
small immediate reward as they could receive more of these in the
allotted time. To account for this, most studies that present large
delayed rewards and small immediate rewards add a post-reward
delay to set a fixed trial duration regardless of which option is
selected. However, recent findings have questioned the validity of
this approach Blanchard et al. (2013).
As our method isolates a single parameter—either delay or
quantity—no post-reward buffer was required. The present data
in fact argue against long-term rate estimations driving animals’
decisions in this study. At the start of testing, the expected long-
term rate for either option would be equivalent. As all animals
showed a preference for the variable option, the delay on the sta-
ble option was decreased. At this point the stable option would
provide a greater long-term rate; yet the rats still favored the
variable delay.
Hayden et al. (2008) argue that such a preference need not
be due to a discounting curve, but may rather be indicative of
a preference for uncertainty itself. By controlling for the pre-
dicted influence of utility curves these researchers demonstrated
that discounting itself was insufficient to fully explain choice
behavior while their subjects showed a strong preference for
uncertainty. Our current data does not rule out such an interpre-
tation.Whether the preference is due to the reinforcing properties
of delayed rewards, or to the effect of variability itself, the present
method allows for the quantification of this preference without
any confound from the quantity of the reward.
In summary, many factors influence preference in the types
of choice tasks described above. Different procedures and differ-
ent testing conditions may isolate or accentuate some of these
factors over others. Only by developing methodological tools to
isolate each factor can researchers proceed to design rigorous
empirical tests of the varied decision theories. We do not sug-
gest that delay discounting is the sole, or even primary factor
in such choices. The above presented method, however, will be
an important tool for isolating the delay (or quantity) discount-
ing components which will allow tests of the magnitude—or lack
thereof—of their influence on decision making.
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS
While humans and non-human animals show similar patterns in
peak interval testing (Rakitin et al., 1998), it has been suggested
that humans and animals differ in impulsive choice. Specifically,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as a
better explanatory model of inter-temporal choice in humans.
While there is no doubt about this model’s effectiveness, the dif-
ferences from the models of animal behavior may have less to
do with species differences as with differences in the test. Many
human tasks designed to explore delay discounting use secondary
reinforcers (e.g., money) and hypothetical scenarios. These con-
ditions require a different set of cognitive processes than those
required for the decision tasks employed in animal studies. When
the hypothetical scenarios are replaced by primary reinforcers,
human subjects’ responses follow similar patterns as those of non-
human primates (Hayden and Platt, 2009). Thus, these methods
may be an effective tool in human studies provided the human
subjects’ task is framed appropriately. This could allow clinicians
to explore mechanisms of addiction with these methods while the
predictions of prospect theory may still serve best in modeling
human choice in economic settings.
CONCLUSIONS
The delay discounting method we introduce here provides advan-
tages over current methods as subjects’ responses to delays and
quantities can be assessed independently. By separately assessing
how variability in delay or variability in reward size contribute to
the correlations observed in psychological disorders, researchers
can focus on the neurological pathways thatmay bemost relevant.
Further, these methods have been optimized to be used in early
adolescent rats. Such an approach will provide valuable insight
into the mechanisms of addiction and may inform intervention
and treatment methods.
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